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The Affordable
Care Act's
Preventive
Services Mandate:
Breaking Down
the Barriers to
Nationwide Access
to Preventive
Services
John Aloysius Cogan Jr.
he most prominent - and certainly the most
controversial - feature of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (the ACA, or
the Act), is the so-called "individual mandate,' which
attempts to address the problem of 50 million unin-
sured by requiring nearly all Americans, beginning
in 2014, to obtain health insurance.2 While expanded
access to health insurance has been both the corner-
stone and the lightening rod of the ACA, the Act also
contains significant public health provisions focusing
on, among other things, promoting the availability of
prevention and wellness services. Although these pub-
lic health provisions have been greeted with mixed
reviews 3 there has been very little discussion of what
may be the ACA's most significant public health fea-
ture: the preventive services mandate. In a bold stroke,
the ACA changes the way evidence-based preventive
services will be provided and paid for by private health
insurance plans, Medicare, and Medicaid. By requir-
ing these health plans to provide evidence-based pre-
ventive services with no out-of-pocket costs, the ACA
transforms the U.S.'s public and private health care
financing systems into vehicles for promoting public
health.
The ACA's preventive services mandate accom-
plishes this transformation by breaking down two
barriers that have heretofore precluded the avail-
ability of nationwide access to uniform preventive
services through individual and group health plans.
The first barrier - the public health-health care
barrier that has focused our health care system on
cure rather than prevention - is both conceptual
and functional.4 For over 50 years, separate goals,
methods, and resources have divided public health
and health care. Although "mutually dependent and
interactive,"5 both fields have operated separately
for the last half century, leading to a dominance
of individual-based, curative medicine and a lack
of population-based preventive health measures.
The consequences of this division have been an
expensive and poorly performing health care sys-
tem that shuns preventive care in favor of curative
interventions.'
The second barrier - the boundaries that keep the
health care system too fragmented to allow for uni-
form availability of preventive services - is legal. The
ACA's evidence-based preventive services provisions
tear down the jurisdictional divides erected by state
lines and the preemption barricade created by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
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(ERISA),7 which renders impossible the provision of
a uniform set of evidence-based preventive services to
the U.S. population. The dissolution of these barriers
guarantees nearly all Americans access to evidence-
based preventive services.
for older individuals;" requires development of crite-
ria for improving access to medical diagnostic equip-
ment for people with disabilities;14 establishes a public
education campaign focused on oral health preven-
tion and education;16 authorizes the Secretary of the
From a public health standpoint, the most significant provisions of the
ACA are those mandating health plan coverage for evidence-based preventive
services without cost-sharing. In other words, the ACA mandates that patients
have access to preventive health measures without requiring patients to
pay for those services when those services are provided.
The ACA's Public Health Provisions
The ACA's public health provisions contain a wide
array of promising initiatives, directives, and grant
programs. Some of the more notable provisions:
* create a Prevention and Public Health Fund to
distribute $15 billion over 10 years to promote
prevention, wellness, and public health activities,
including prevention research, health screenings,
and immunization programs;8
* establish the National Prevention, Health Pro-
motion and Public Health Council, which will,
among other things, coordinate and develop a
national strategy for prevention, wellness, health
promotion, public health, and integrative health
care;9
* require the Centers for Disease Prevention and
Control to convene a Community Preventive Ser-
vices Task Force (Task Force), require the Task
Force to coordinate with the U.S. Preventive Ser-
vices Task Force (USPSTF), and charge the Task
Force with the review of the scientific evidence
related to the effectiveness, appropriateness,
and cost effectiveness of community preventive
interventions; 10
* establish a national public-private partnership
to carry out communication activities related to
health promotion and disease prevention;" and
* award grants for the development and imple-
mentation of intervention programs to promote
good nutrition and physical activity in children
and adolescents and establish a program to
award grants to support the operation of school-
based health centers.12
The Act also provides for grants for community-based
preventive health activities and intervention programs
Department of Health and Human Services to nego-
tiate prices for vaccines to be purchased by states; 6
requires nutritional labeling for menu items in certain
restaurants and vending machines;17 requires employ-
ers to provide reasonable breaks and appropriate
spaces for nursing mothers to express breast milk;",
and provides assistance for employers to evaluate
workplace wellness programs," among other things.20
Yet, the most significant public health provisions in
the Act are not these initiatives, directives, or grant
programs. From a public health standpoint, the most
significant provisions of the ACA are those mandat-
ing health plan coverage for evidence-based preven-
tive services without cost-sharing. In other words, the
ACA mandates that patients have access to preventive
health measures without requiring patients to pay for
those services when those services are provided.
The ACA's Evidence-Based
Preventive Mandates
The ACA requires all group and individual health
plans21 to cover specific preventive care items and ser-
vices without patient cost-sharing (i.e., copayments,
coinsurance, or deductibles).22 The elimination of
cost-sharing is critical to the success of this mandate;
while cost-sharing is typically viewed as a cost-saving
measure because it reduces consumption and thereby
lowers overall health care costs,23 cost-sharing is actu-
ally counter-productive in the context of preventive
services. Since cost-sharing creates an economic dis-
incentive to access services, use of preventive services
declines when cost-sharing is imposed.24
The ACA's preventive services mandate covers 45
evidence-based preventive services that have been
given a rating of "A" or "B" by the USPSTF.25 Ser-
vices receiving grades of "A" or "B" are recommended
because the USPSTF has determined that the net
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benefit of the service is moderate or substantial.26 The
mandated preventive services address a wide range
of potential health problems and conditions, includ-
ing alcohol abuse, heart disease, obesity, certain types
of cancer, osteoporosis, diabetes, HIV infection, and
tobacco use. For example, all adults, including preg-
nant women, will be covered for primary care-based
screening and behavioral counseling interventions to
reduce alcohol abuse.27 All adults and children aged 6
years and older will be covered for obesity screening
and behavioral interventions to promote weight loss
if diagnosed as obese.2" The mandate also requires
counseling, treatments, and interventions to address
heart disease, such as promoting the use of aspirin to
reduce heart attacks, high blood pressure and choles-
terol screening, and healthy diet counseling.29 Women
over 65 years of age will be screened for osteoporosis.3o
Men over 65 years of age will be screened for abdomi-
nal aortic aneurysm." Tobacco cessation interventions
are also covered.32 In addition, the mandate requires
coverage for evidence-based immunizations for chil-
dren, adolescents, and adults currently recommended
by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Prac-
tices of the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (Advisory Committee), such as the Diphtheria,
Tetanus, and Pertussis vaccine for infants, yearly influ-
enza vaccines for children, and Varicella (Chickenpox)
vaccine for adults,33 and preventive care and screen-
ings for infants, children, adolescents and women
contained in comprehensive guidelines supported by
the Health Resources and Services Administration.34
Medicare services are also included in the ACA's
prevention mandates. The USPSTF's "A" and "B" rec-
ommended preventive services, including certain vac-
cines, wellness visits, and preventive screenings, must
all be provided to senior citizens and other Medicare
eligible patients with no cost-sharing. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was also given
the authority to eliminate Medicare cost-sharing for
other preventive services not recommended by the
USPSTF.36
Medicaid's preventive requirements under the Act
are somewhat different, due mainly to the program's
joint state-federal funding and regulation. Unlike
Medicare, which is funded completely by the federal
government, Medicaid36 is a joint state and federal
public health insurance program for the poor. State
governments administer the program and provide a
range of mandatory and optional services. The federal
government provides states the bulk of the funding for
Medicaid.3 Starting in 2013, the ACA requires Med-
icaid programs that cover certain optional diagnostic
services to cover "A" and "B" level preventive services
recommended by the USPSTF and the immunizations
recommended by the Advisory Committee. The fed-
eral government will pay each state an additional 1%
in Medicaid matching funds to cover the costs of the
preventive services and recommended vaccines if pro-
vided with no cost-sharing." Thus, while not mandat-
ing that preventive services and vaccines be provided
to Medicaid enrollees at no cost, the ACA gives the
states a strong financial incentive to provide the ser-
vices without cost-sharing.
The implications of the ACA's preventive mandate
are profound. Once the ACA's individual mandate takes
effect (assuming it is not overturned by the Supreme
Court or repealed by Congress), if every state and the
District of Columbia were to include preventive ser-
vices in their Medicaid programs with no cost- shar-
ing, then 95% of all non-elderly U.S residents could be
covered by a uniform set of evidence-based preventive
services with no out-of pocket-costs by 2016.39
The Barriers to Nationwide Access to
Preventive Services
The ACAs preventive services mandate represents a
fundamental change to our health care system that is
only made possible by the ACA's ability to break down
two significant barriers: (1) the public health-health
care barrier that has focused our health care system on
cure rather than prevention and (2) the legal bound-
aries imposed by the states and ERISA that keep the
health care system too fragmented to allow for a uni-
form availability of preventive services. In order to
fully appreciate the consequences of the first barrier
- the public health-health care divide - it is impor-
tant to understand the divide itself, how it came about,
and its repurcussions.
Conceptually and functionally, the nation's health
care system is viewed as consisting of two distinct
components: health care and public health.o The
health care component is structured around organiz-
ing, financing, and delivering individual-level, cura-
tive medical care. To most Americans, "health care" is
an amorphous term, encompassing everything from
health insurance carriers, to hospitals, physicians, and
pharmacies. It also means Medicare, Medicaid, and
every other person, place, or thing that provides or
pays for curative medical care.4 ' Health care in the U.S.
is a highly visible enterprise that consumes more than
95% of all U.S. health-related spending.42 Its practitio-
ners, most prominently physicians, are highly visible,
culturally respected, and generally well-compensated
individuals whose heroic feats are covered widely by
the press. 43
Public health, on the other hand, is "the collective
response to the health threats a society faces."1 Public
health focuses on the health status of entire popula-
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tions, not just individuals. In other words, the focus
is on everyone at once, not just sick people.45 Histori-
cally, public health focused on community sanitation
and environmental hazards. 46 But most people no lon-
ger die from the spread of communicable diseases and
poor sanitation. Now people tend to die from "expo-
sure to the fruits of affluence," such as poor diets, lack
of exercise, easy access to tobacco products, and "the
bitter harvest of social stresses," including violence and
drug and alcohol abuse.4 The modern role of public
health has expanded to include research and efforts
to address these problems. In addition, public health
is responsible for, among other things, understanding
and mitigating the social, behavioral, and environ-
mental factors that contribute to health
status, sanitation, clean air and water, vac-
cination, isolation and quarantine, inspec-
tion of food and the food service industry, Comp
licensure of medical professionals and the U.
facilities, discipline of medical profession-
als, tracking the spread of disease, and healtl
planning and stockpiling of emergency the U.
supplies.4*
Unlike those in health care, public
health's practitioners are less visible, mone
less well-respected, and overall not com- U.S. -"
pensated as well as physicians. They are Ea
licensed health professionals, bureaucrats,
politicians, and scientists. Although less
visible, the public health workforce is vast,
spreading across every layer of government and across
wide geographic areas .49 And, unlike their health care
counterparts, public health practitioners receive little
attention for their work, perhaps with the exception
of recently reported threats of pandemics and bioter-
rorism.50 Yet, despite its expansive nature and critical
importance, public health spending comprises only a
small part of total U.S. health care spending, gener-
ally less than 5% .51 Put into context, total per capita
health spending in the U.S. was $8,086 per person in
2009. Of that, only about $251 was spent on public
health .52
There are a few possible explanations for this
disparity. On the one hand, public health's diffuse
nature tends to give public health an "everywhere
and nowhere" quality,5l making it invisible to most
Americans .5 4 Another is the so-called "prevention
paradox,'" the idea that a preventive treatment that
offers large benefits to a large population offers only
a negligible benefit to each individual in that popu-
lation. For example, a routine measles vaccination
offers only marginal health benefits to any one child
because the risk of infection is low. Nevertheless, such
vaccines significantly contribute to the health of the
overall population.66 The prevention paradox can lead
to a lack of interest and compliance problems when
population-level public health prevention programs
are introduced. The real problem for public health,
however, stems from the ascension of health care and
the boundary that ascension created between health
care and public health. This is the origin of the public
health-health care divide.
The Growing Dominance of
Health Care over Public Health
In the late 19th century public health and health care
were viewed as overlapping endeavors. They had com-
mon goals and membership. Physicians participated
ared to other developed countries,
S. spends an enormous amount for its
care. Per capita health expenditures in
S. are nearly double the average of 15
rn developed nations. If spending more
y produced better outcomes, then the
ould certainly be the healthiest country
rth. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
heavily in public health planning and programs; pub-
lic health practitioners and physicians were allies in
advancing public health reforms.5 6 But the happy
marriage of public health and health care would not
last. By the mid-20th century, improvements in physi-
cian education and skill, better hospital care, advances
in medical technology, and the ascendance of the bio-
medical model greatly improved the quality of indi-
vidualized, curative medical treatment.5 7
The biomedical model, which focused on biology,
physiology, pathology, biochemistry, and other strictly
science-based approaches to health care, developed
effective responses to disease. Individualized medi-
cal treatment, rather than public health, became
the dominant mode of health care delivery. As more
individuals became patients in an expanding tertiary
health care system, the impact of social, economic,
behavioral, and environmental factors on health was
discounted. They were no longer considered signifi-
cant contributors to disease and disability. As one his-
tory of the public health-health care split noted, "The
very nature of the biomedical paradigm was to uncou-
ple disease from its social roots."58 Once removed from
health care, public health faded deep into the back-
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ground, and to most people, was of little consequence
to their personal health.69
The result of this focus on curative, individual-based
care and its accompanying aversion to prevention
is a system that is expensive and performs poorly.60
Health care spending in the U.S. is exorbitant and has
been rising rapidly for years. In 2009, the U.S. spent
$8,086 per person on health care,6" and spending has
been increasing at a rapid rate over the last several
decades. 62 Compared to other developed countries, the
U.S. spends an enormous amount for its health care.
Per capita health expenditures in the U.S. are nearly
double the average of 15 Western developed nations. 63
If spending more money produced better outcomes,
then the U.S. would certainly be the healthiest country
on Earth. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Despite its profligate spending, the U.S. remains an
international health laggard, consistently underper-
forming on most quality measures relative to other
countries. A Commonwealth Fund report ranked the
U.S. last compared to six other comparable nations
(Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom). 64 The World
Health Organization ranks the U.S. health care system
37th in the world.6 6 Such rankings are not without their
critics.6 6 Other statistics, though, appear to confirm
the U.S.'s low health ranking among other comparable
nations. For example, the U.S. consistently has had
the lowest life expectancy rate and the highest infant
mortality rate among G8 countries. 67 More mothers
die in childbirth in the United States per 100,000
births than in other G8 countries, at nearly double the
average of other G8 countries. In terms of prevent-
able years of life lost, which is a measure of prevent-
able deaths occurring at younger ages, the U.S. ranks
highest among G8 countries.6 As one commenter put
it, "When it comes to population statistics like these,
the U.S. looks absolutely horrible. This leads many to
the conclusion that these metrics must all be fatally
flawed. I'd be more likely to agree if we weren't dead
last in all of them."69
Ironically, the U.S.'s high spending and poor health
are connected. A large percentage of the increase
in U.S. health care spending can be attributed to
unhealthy lifestyles and behaviors, including obesity.70
Indeed, the top three leading causes of death in the
U.S. stem from preventable causes: tobacco use, obe-
sity, and alcohol abuse.71 The prevalence of obesity
is on the rise, progress in reducing tobacco use has
slowed,72 and the incidence of alcohol dependence or
abuse has remained constant.73 Chronic conditions
such as heart disease, cancer, and stroke account for
more than 50% of all deaths each year. Currently,
seven out of ten deaths annually among Americans
result from chronic diseases, and the percentage of
Americans with chronic conditions is on the increase.
At their current pace, chronic conditions are projected
to increase by over 40% by 2023,74 despite the vast
sums we spend on health care each year.
The ACA is expected to expand coverage by about
30 million and reduce the number of uninsured by
more than half.76 But given the poor performance of
the U.S.'s health care system, expansion of coverage
alone does not promise better health outcomes. The
most effective way to address preventable disease and
chronic conditions is by providing effective and uni-
form preventive services. Up to now, however, the U.S.
health care system was not equipped to do so. The pri-
macy of the biomedical model and curative medicine
created a barrier between public health and health
care. The result has been escalating health care costs
and an explosion of preventable disease. By breaking
down this barrier and coupling population-focused,
evidence-based preventive services with the insurance
plans that finance health care, the U.S., through the
Affordable Care Act, finally has the capability to sys-
tematically address preventable disease and moderate
health care costs.
ERISA and the Legal Barrier to Access to
Preventive Services
The second barrier toppled by the ACAs preventive
services mandate is the legal framework that frag-
ments the delivery of health care and previously made
the possibility of uniform preventive services man-
dates impossible. This fragmentation has its roots in
the health care financing system.
Health care is financed through a mix of public and
private health insurance plans regulated by the state
and federal governments. In addition to Medicare and
Medicaid, there are private health insurance plans,
which finance health care for the bulk of the popu-
lation.76 There are also state and local government
plans. Since enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act in 1944,77 primary regulatory authority over these
public and private health insurance plans has been
distributed horizontally across the states. 7 Since the
mid-1970s, however, with the enactment of ERISA,79
the federal government has shared the regulatory role
of the states, creating a vertical distribution of author-
ity, but only with respect to employer-based health
plans. These horizontal and vertical distributions of
authority have produced a highly fragmented health
care financing system and a hodgepodge of regula-
tions that has made impossible any attempt to bring
nationwide uniformity to the preventive services ben-
efits offered by health plans.
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The problem is not with the creation of prevention
mandate laws. Many states, in fact, require health
insurance plans within their jurisdictions to cover
preventive services.8o These prevention mandates are
part of a larger body of state health insurance ben-
efit mandates that cover preventive care as well as
additional services offered by specific providers. In
general, state benefit mandates require health insur-
ers and/or health plans to provide coverage for a spe-
cific group of people (e.g., dependants), coverage for
a specific disease or condition (e.g., Lyme disease or
infertility), reimbursement for services provided by
specific types of providers (e.g., podiatrists or nurse
midwives), reimbursement for certain types of medi-
cal devices or pharmaceuticals (e.g., hearing aids or
Chantix), or provide reimbursement for a minimum
quantity of benefits (e.g., coverage for minimum hos-
pital stay after mastectomy) .' Since the 1970s, these
mandates, the overwhelming majority of which do not
cover preventive services, have grown in number, and
more are enacted every year.82
Many reasons have been cited to explain the prolif-
eration of state benefit mandates. For example, state
benefit mandates have been described as an attempt
to correct the market response to the information
asymmetry inherent in the private insurance market.**
Individuals typically have more information about
their own medical conditions than health insurance
companies. This, in turn, creates fear-based incentives
for insurers to offer more limited coverage than the
public generally desires.84 State benefit mandates are
also thought to address adverse selection problems.
For example, if insurers are allowed to exclude cover-
age for some high-cost conditions, then persons who
need coverage for those conditions will be forced to
deal with a limited pool of insurers, who will charge
significantly more for coverage.8 5 Mandates have also
been justified on that ground that they prevent nega-
tive externalities, for example, providing coverage for
vaccines from communicable diseases. Such externali-
ties would arise when an individual concludes that her
risk of contracting infectious diseases is sufficiently
low to justify foregoing health insurance coverage
for immunizations. Such a decision would fail to take
into account the benefit to society that results from
the immunization.8 6 Benefit mandates also operate as
cross-subsidization. For example, requiring everyone
to purchase coverage for maternity or mental health
treatment makes the benefits more affordable for
those who will use them.87
Despite all these seemingly reasonable bases for
mandates, the proliferation of mandates, in many
cases, resulted from far less noble reasons. Beneficia-
ries of state benefit mandates tend to be "concentrated
interests represented by well-organized groups of
health care professionals" and "persons or parents of
persons with a specific medical condition, who have
an intense interest in a particular mandate and its
outcome."88 Since the costs of state benefit mandates
are diffuse and spread over the entire insured popu-
lation,89 the cost of any particular mandate is small,
usually less than 1% of the cost of the premium.9o State
benefit mandates are therefore politically attractive.
Enacting a mandate creates the perception that a poli-
tician is doing something about health care. But the
relatively low cost of a mandate tends to discourage
any significant opposition from those who will actu-
ally pay for the mandate.9'
Furthermore, political expediency rather than a sci-
entific basis appears to be a central ingredient in the
success of many state benefit mandates. Two promi-
nent examples include the adoption benefit mandates
covering high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplantation (HDC/ABMT) and
minimum length of stay requirements for mothers
and newborns. In the late 1980s, some physicians pro-
moted HDC/ABMT as a new form of treatment for
breast cancer. The process involved a complicated and
highly expensive process whereby a patient's bone mar-
row was extracted and frozen, the patient was dosed
with high levels of chemotherapy, then the marrow
was replaced. Although HDC/ABMT had no clinical
evidence to support its effectiveness for breast cancer,
it was widely used. The treatment was expensive and
the insurance industry balked, resulting in widespread
litigation.92 In response to political pressure and emo-
tional appeals, several states passed laws mandating
insurance coverage for HDC/ABMT. Eventually, clini-
cal trials established that HDC/ABMT was not effec-
tive. Nevertheless, repeal of existing HDC/ABMT
mandates was difficult, despite the contrary clinical
evidence.93 By the time HDC/ABMT had been proven
ineffective, 30,000 women had received the treatment
at a cost of $3 billion.94 Similarly, mother and newborn
length-of-stay mandates were enacted despite any
evidence that shorter stays were harmful and/or that
longer stays improved the health of mother or infants.
Ultimately, "the rhetoric of 'drive-through deliveries'
was politically compelling and engendered a broad
coalition of supporters," resulting in passage. 96
The problem with state benefit mandate laws, how-
ever, is not only that they may not be scientifically
based but also that they are expensive. Many states
have 40 or more mandates. Although most mandates
increase the costs of health insurance by less than
1%, the cumulative effect of 40 or more mandates
can impose a significant increase in the cost of cov-
erage. 96 ERISA, however, gives employers a way out:
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as described next, self-funded ERISA health plans are
exempt from state coverage mandate laws. This means
that employers can opt out of state benefit mandates,
including those that mandate preventive services.
ERISA and the Exemption from State
Benefit Mandates
Most people get their health insurance through
employer-sponsored health benefit plans. Approxi-
mately 57% of the civilian population under age 65,
or 157 million persons, are covered by employment-
based group health insurance. Only about 5% of the
civilian population under age 65 gets their coverage
through private non-group insurance.9 7 While all pri-
vate non-group health insurance plans are subject to
the risk of paying the plan's claims and performs all
of the plan's administrative functions, such as setting
premium rates, maintaining provider networks, pro-
cessing claims, and adjudicating coverage disputes.
In contrast, under a self-insured health plan, the
employer assumes the risk of paying the plan's claims.
The employer directly funds the health benefits for its
covered enrollees and typically contracts out the plan's
administrative functions, often to an insurance com-
pany. The distinction between fully-insured and self-
insured is often lost on employees, their beneficiaries,
and health care providers, who typically do not under-
stand the difference between the two types of plans
and do not know which kind of plan their employer
provides.
The ACA's preventive services mandate represents a major breakthrough for
national health reform because it transforms the nation's public and private
health care systems into public health delivery vehicles. In doing so, the ACA
broke down two significant barriers to meaningful reform: the public health-
health care divide, which led to the prevalence of curative rather than preventive
medicine, and the legal framework that fragments the financing and delivery of
health care, which was perpetuated by ERISA. As a result, prevention measures
with proven effectiveness will now be provided on a national and uniform basis,
with the potential to improve health outcomes and reduce costs.
state insurance laws, many group plans are not. Most
employment-based group health plans are covered by
ERISA,98 and the majority of employers self-insure.99
Although adopted primarily to bring uniformity to
pension law and protect multi-state employers from
the burden of different state laws,100 ERISA also reg-
ulates employee benefits, such as health insurance.
Despite its promise of uniformity, ERISA has pro-
duced anything but uniformity with respect to state
insurance regulation. ERISA has created confusion
and spawned innumerable lawsuits, many of which
center on the applicability of state insurance laws to
ERISA plans. Put simply, whether an ERISA health
plan is subject to state insurance laws depends on one
factor: how the ERISA plan is funded.
Employers can fund health benefit plans several
ways. One way is to create a so-called fully-insured
plan. As the name suggests, a fully-insured health
benefit plan is group health insurance coverage pur-
chased from an insurer. In exchange for a premium,
which is typically shared by the employer and the
employee, the insurer (and not the employer) assumes
Self-insured ERISA plans are not subject to state
insurance laws, while fully-insured plans are sub-
ject to state laws. The basis for this can be found in
ERISA's so-called "conflict preemption" provision
and its exceptions.'0 This highly confusing and much
litigated section of ERISA provides that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws" that "relate to any
employee benefit plan."o2 This provision was appar-
ently intended to permit multi-state employers to offer
benefit plans on a national basis without the burden of
having to conform to the laws of every state in which
they operate.10 However, ERISAs "savings clause"104
then exempts from preemption state laws that regu-
late insurers. As a result, states are free to impose a
wide range of regulatory requirements, including ben-
efit mandates, on health insurers that sell employer-
based benefit plans. There is, however, another excep-
tion. The so-called "deemer clause"o6 provides that a
self-insured plan shall not be deemed to be engaged in
the business of insurance for the purpose of state law
regulation.106 In other words, if an employer obtains
health insurance from an insurance company (and is
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therefore fully insured), that employer's plan will be
subject to state insurance laws, such as mandates. If,
on the other hand, an employer's health plan is self-
insured, that employer's plan is not subject to state
insurance laws, even if an insurance company admin-
isters the plan.o7 Essentially, the "deemer clause" pro-
hibits the states from regulating self-insured employer
health benefit plans but does not prevent the regula-
tion of fully-insured plans.os Thus, by self-insuring,
an employer can avoid state insurance mandates. This
is an important point because approximately 55% of
persons with ERISA health plan coverage are cov-
ered by self-insured plans, with fully-insured plans
covering the remainder.109 This means that even if a
majority of states banded together to enact a particu-
lar prevention mandate, more than half of the group
plans would not have to comply. As a result, ERISA
has been a major impediment to effective large-scale
health care reform at the state level.
The ACA breaks down the ERISA barrier by mak-
ing the preventive services mandates applicable to all
group health plans, including all ERISA plans, regard-
less of whether they are fully-insured or self-insured.no
This means that, for the first time, a uniform set of
evidence-based preventive services is available on
a nationwide basis to everyone enrolled in a group
health plan. The ACA does not repeal ERISA. State
law benefit mandates are still subject to ERISA, and
self-insured plans do not have to comply with such
laws. Thus, there will still be significant fragmenta-
tion in the U.S health care system; all the problems
that fragmentation engenders will remain. However,
with the passage of the ACA, the barriers that frag-
ment the health care system no longer apply to a core
set of evidence-based preventive services.
Conclusion
The ACA's preventive services mandate represents
a major breakthrough for national health reform
because it transforms the nation's public and private
health care systems into public health delivery vehi-
cles. In doing so, the ACA broke down two significant
barriers to meaningful reform: the public health-
health care divide, which led to the prevalence of cura-
tive rather than preventive medicine, and the legal
framework that fragments the financing and delivery
of health care, which was perpetuated by ERISA. As
a result, prevention measures with proven effective-
ness will now be provided on a national and uniform
basis, with the potential to improve health outcomes
and reduce costs.
Nevertheless, questions remain with respect to
implementation of the ACA's preventive services
mandates. Will the mandates generate unanticipated
negative externalities? For example, will the mandates
adversely affect physician workloads, further reduc-
ing the availability of primary care physicians? Since
cost-sharing is considered by health insurers when
physician reimbursement rates are determined, will
the prohibition on patient cost-sharing for mandated
preventive services lead health insurers to reduce
reimbursements to physicians for preventive services
(i.e., by not covering the lost copayments)? The imple-
mentation of the mandates will no doubt raise many
more questions and generate unanticipated outcomes.
There are also questions as to whether the preventive
mandates will be sufficiently effective to justify their
costs, although a recent estimate did hold out the
promise of positive gains from the types of preven-
tive services mandated by the ACA.111 Regardless of
how these questions are answered, the groundwork
has been laid for incorporating population-level, evi-
dence-based preventive services into the U.S.'s public
and private health care systems. This is a significant
step forward for public health and a starting point
for further integration of the public health and health
care systems.
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